"Public Good Provision with a Distributor" with Alexander Matros and Sonali SenGupta  

1. • [PDF] [arXiv] [SSRN]

   • Abstract. We present a model of public good provision with a distributor. Our main result describes a symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium, where all agents contribute to a common fund with probability p and the distributor provides either a particular amount of public goods or nothing. A corollary of this finding is the efficient public good provision equilibrium where all agents contribute to the common fund, all agents are expected to contribute, and the distributor spends the entire common fund for the public good provision.

"Efficient Public Good Provision in a Multipolar World" with Jorge Bruno, Renaud Foucart and Sonali SenGupta

1. • Submitted | [PDF] [arXiv] 

   • Abstract. We model a public goods game with groups, position uncertainty, and observational learning. Contributions are simultaneous within groups, but groups play sequentially based on their observation of an incomplete sample of past contributions. We show that full cooperation between and within groups is possible with self-interested players on a fixed horizon. Position uncertainty implies the existence of an equilibrium where groups of players conditionally cooperate in the hope of influencing further groups. Conditional cooperation implies that each group member is pivotal, so that efficient simultaneous provision within groups is an equilibrium.

   • Previously circulated as "A Group Public Goods Game with Position Uncertainty".

"Pricing and EV charging equilibria" with Jorge Bruno, Trivikram Dokka, and Sonali SenGupta

1. • New Version Coming Soon!

   • Previous Version | [PDF] [arXiv] [SSRN]

   • Abstract. We study equilibria in an Electric Vehicle (EV) charging game, a cost minimization game inherent to decentralized charging control strategy for EV power demand management. In our model, each user optimizes its total cost which is sum of direct power cost and the indirect dissatisfaction cost. We show that taking player specific price independent dissatisfaction cost in to account, contrary to popular belief, herding only happens at lower EV uptake. Moreover, this is true for both linear and logistic dissatisfaction functions. We study the question of existence of price profiles to induce a desired equilibrium. We define two types of equilibria, distributed and non-distributed equilibria, and show that under logistic dissatisfaction, only non-distributed equilibria are possible by feasibly setting prices. In linear case, both type of equilibria are possible but price discrimination is necessary to induce distributed equilibria. Finally, we show that in the case of symmetric EV users, mediation cannot improve upon Nash equilibria.

"Tax Evasion, Embezzlement and Public Good Provision" with Alexander Matros and Sonali SenGupta 

"Position uncertainty in a sequential public goods game: an experiment" with Konstantinos Georgalos [Status : Data Analysis]

"Data-driven online scheduling of EV home charging" with Trivikram Dokka and Amin Yarahmadi [Status : Draft coming soon]

"Stronger bounds for effort and welfare maximizing equilibria in network public good games" with  Jorge Bruno, Trivikram Dokka, and Sonali SenGupta