"Position Uncertainty in a Sequential Public Goods Game: An Experiment" with Konstantinos Georgalos

• • Experimental Economics 27, 820–853 (2024) | [ Link 1 ] | [ Link 2 ] | [ arXiv ] | [ Pre-registration ]

  • Abstract.   Gallice and Monzón (2019) present a natural environment that sustains full co-operation in one-shot social dilemmas among a finite number of self-interested agents. They demonstrate that in a sequential public goods game, where agents lack knowledge of their position in the sequence but can observe some predecessors’ actions, full contribution emerges in equilibrium due to agents’ incentive to induce potential successors to follow suit. In this study, we aim to test the theoretical predictions of this model through an economic experiment. We conducted three treatments, varying the amount of information about past actions that a subject can observe, as well as their positional awareness. Through rigorous structural econometric analysis, we found that approximately 25% of the subjects behaved in line with the theoretical predictions. However, we also observed the presence of alternative behavioural types among the remaining subjects. The majority were classified as conditional co-operators, showing a willingness to cooperate based on others’ actions. Some subjects exhibited altruistic tendencies, while only a small minority engaged in free-riding behaviour.

"Efficient Public Good Provision Between and Within Groups" with Jorge Bruno, Renaud Foucart and Sonali SenGupta

• • Games and Economic Behavior 150, 183-190 (2025) | [ Link ] | [ arXiv ]

  • Abstract. We generalize the model of Gallice and Monzon (2019) to incorporate a public goods game with groups, position uncertainty, and observational learning. Contributions are simultaneous within groups, but groups play sequentially based on their observation of an incomplete sample of past contributions. We show that full cooperation between and within groups is possible with self-interested players on a fixed horizon. Position uncertainty implies the existence of an equilibrium where groups of players conditionally cooperate in the hope of influencing further groups. Conditional cooperation implies that each group member is pivotal, so that efficient simultaneous provision within groups is an equilibrium.

  • Previously circulated as "Efficient Public Good Provision in a Multipolar World".

"Public Good Provision with a Governor" with Alexander Matros and Sonali SenGupta  

1. • R&R @ Mathematical Social Sciences | [arXiv] | [Job Market Paper 1]

   • Abstract. We study a public good game with N citizens and a Governor who allocates resources from a common fund. Citizens may voluntarily contribute or be compelled to do so if audited, in which case shirkers face a penalty. The Governor decides how much of the fund to devote to public good provision, with the remainder embezzled. Crucially, the Governor's utility combines material payoffs from embezzlement with belief-dependent reputational concerns. We fully characterize the symmetric subgame perfect equilibria (SSPE) of the game. The model always admits at least one pure-strategy equilibrium, ranging from universal free-riding with complete embezzlement to full contribution with efficient provision. Mixed-strategy equilibria exist only in a narrow region of parameter values and may involve multiple equilibria. Our analysis highlights the roles of penalties, audits, and reputational incentives in sustaining contribution and provision, thereby linking public good provision with the broader literature on corruption, embezzlement, and psychological game theory.

"Position Uncertainty in a Sequential Prisoner’s Dilemma Game: An Experiment" with Konstantinos Georgalos and Sonali SenGupta

1. • Under Review | [arXiv] |  [Job Market Paper 2]

   • Abstract. Gallice and Monzón (2019) present a natural environment that sustains full cooperation in one-shot social dilemmas among a finite number of self-interested agents. They demonstrate that in a sequential public goods game, where agents lack knowledge of their position in the sequence but can observe some predecessors’ actions, full contribution emerges in equilibrium due to agents’ incentive to induce potential successors to follow suit. Furthermore, they show that this principle extends to a number of social dilemmas, with the prominent example that of the prisoner’s dilemma. In this study, we experimentally test the theoretical predictions of this model in a multi-player prisoner’s dilemma environment, where subjects are not aware of their position in the sequence and receive only partial information on past cooperating actions. We test the predictions of the model, and through rigorous structural econometric analysis, we test the descriptive capacity of the model against alternative behavioural strategies, such as conditional cooperation, altruistic play and free-riding behaviour. We find that the majority resorts to free-riding behaviour, around 30% is classified as Gallice and Monzón (2019) types, followed by those with social preference considerations and the unconditional altruists.

"Equilibria in Budget Games with Dissatisfaction Cost" with Jorge Bruno, Trivikram Dokka, and Sonali SenGupta

1. • New Version Coming Soon!

   • Previous Version | [arXiv] [SSRN]

"Strategy Heterogeneity in Human-AI Interactions: An Experiment" with Konstantinos Georgalos

"Data-driven online scheduling of EV home charging" with Trivikram Dokka

"Tax Evasion, Embezzlement and Public Good Provision" with Alexander Matros and Sonali SenGupta 

"Stronger Bounds for Effort and Welfare Maximizing Equilibria in Network Public Good Games" with  Jorge Bruno, Trivikram Dokka, and Sonali SenGupta