Research Interests

Applied Game Theory | Public Economics | Political Economy | Experimental Economics

Working Papers

  1. "Public Good Provision with a Distributor" with Alexander Matros and Sonali SenGupta

      • Under Review| [PDF] [arXiv] [SSRN]

      • Abstract. We present a model of public good provision with a distributor. Our main result describes a symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium, where all agents contribute to a common fund with probability p and the distributor provides either a particular amount of public goods or nothing. A corollary of this finding is the efficient public good provision equilibrium where all agents contribute to the common fund, all agents are expected to contribute, and the distributor spends the entire common fund for the public good provision.

  2. "A Group Public Goods Game with Position Uncertainty" with Jorge Bruno and Sonali SenGupta

      • Under Review | [PDF] [arXiv] [SSRN]

      • Abstract. We model a dynamic public good contribution game, where players are (naturally) formed into groups. The groups are exogenously placed in a sequence, with limited information available to players about their groups' position in the sequence. Contribution decisions are made by players simultaneously and independently, and the groups' total contribution is made sequentially. We try to capture both inter and intra-group behaviors and analyze different situations where players observe partial history about total contributions of their predecessor groups. Given this framework, we show that even when players observe a history of defection (no contribution), a cooperative outcome is achievable. This is particularly interesting in the situation when players observe only their immediate predecessor groups' contribution, where we observe that players play an important role in motivating others to contribute.

  3. "Pricing and EV charging equilibria" with Jorge Bruno, Trivikram Dokka, and Sonali SenGupta

      • Submitted | [PDF] [arXiv] [SSRN]

      • Abstract. We study equilibria in an Electric Vehicle (EV) charging game, a cost minimization game inherent to decentralized charging control strategy for EV power demand management. In our model, each user optimizes its total cost which is sum of direct power cost and the indirect dissatisfaction cost. We show that taking player specific price independent dissatisfaction cost in to account, contrary to popular belief, herding only happens at lower EV uptake. Moreover, this is true for both linear and logistic dissatisfaction functions. We study the question of existence of price profiles to induce a desired equilibrium. We define two types of equilibria, distributed and non-distributed equilibria, and show that under logistic dissatisfaction, only non-distributed equilibria are possible by feasibly setting prices. In linear case, both type of equilibria are possible but price discrimination is necessary to induce distributed equilibria. Finally, we show that in the case of symmetric EV users, mediation cannot improve upon Nash equilibria.

  4. "Tax Evasion, Embezzlement and Public Good Provision" with Alexander Matros and Sonali SenGupta

Work in Progress

  1. "Position uncertainty in a sequential public goods game: an experiment" with Konstantinos Georgalos [Status : Data collection]

  2. "Data-driven online scheduling of EV home charging" with Trivikram Dokka and Amin Yarahmadi [Status : Draft coming soon]